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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 1
The National Association for Public Defense
(“NAPD”) is an association of more than 14,000
professionals who deliver the right to counsel
throughout all U.S. states and territories. NAPD
members include attorneys, investigators, social
workers, administrators, and other support staff
who are responsible for executing the constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel. NAPD’s
members are advocates in jails, in courtrooms, and
in communities and are experts in not only
theoretical best practices, but also in the practical,
day-to-day delivery of legal services.
Their
collective expertise represents state, county, and
local systems through full-time, contract, and
assigned counsel delivery mechanisms, dedicated
juvenile, capital and appellate offices, and a
diversity of traditional and holistic practice models.
In addition, NAPD hosts annual conferences
and webinars where discovery, investigation, crossexamination, and prosecutorial duties are
addressed. NAPD also provides training to its
members concerning zealous pretrial and trial
advocacy and strives to obtain optimal results for
clients both at the trial level and on appeal.
Accordingly, NAPD has a strong interest in the
1 Counsel for Amicus provided notice to the parties of their

intent to file an amicus brief on September 1, 2017, giving
more than ten days advance notice. The parties have
consented to the filing of this brief and attached hereto are
their letters of consent. Pursuant to Rule 37.6, amicus states
that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in
part, and no person or entity, other than amicus and its
counsel, made a monetary contribution to the preparation or
submission of the brief.
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issues raised in this case and fully supports the
grounds for certiorari identified by Petitioner.
As Petitioner has detailed, this case presents
a concrete federal and state court split on an
important constitutional issue, and the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision is on the wrong side of that
split. Furthermore, the facts of this case present
an ideal vehicle for addressing the issue, as the
decision below accepts the premise that the
government may knowingly use false testimony to
convict a criminal defendant.
This Court’s
jurisprudence, and basic principles of fairness and
due process, reject such a proposition.
NAPD writes separately as amicus curiae
only to provide additional discussion, from the
perspective of the indigent criminal defense bar,
about the importance of the issue and the practical
implications of the Eleventh Circuit’s rule if left
unchecked.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioner’s case asks a basic but
fundamental question: Will our criminal justice
system permit convictions obtained through the
knowing use of false testimony, simply because the
prosecutor has not also suppressed evidence
indicating the testimony was false? The Eleventh
Circuit answered this question in the affirmative,
but for decades this Court has known a very
different justice system, one in which the knowing,
uncorrected use of false testimony by the
prosecutor could never be countenanced. And for
good reason. As this Court has long recognized, the
knowing use of false testimony is “as inconsistent
with the rudimentary demands of justice as is the
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obtaining of a like result by intimidation.” Mooney
v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935).
The manner in which the Eleventh Circuit’s
rule undermines the integrity of the criminal
justice system becomes especially acute when
considering the overwhelming burdens and
obstacles that the indigent defense bar encounters
in striving to fulfill their constitutional and ethical
duties to clients. Public defenders throughout this
country perform a noble and often heroic function,
providing adversarial representation for the people
of the United States, “one at a time.” See Kaley v.
United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1114 (2014)
(Roberts, J. dissenting) (“Federal prosecutors, when
they rise in court, represent the people of
the United States. But so do defense lawyers—one
at a time.”). What’s more, they do so in the vast
majority of criminal cases. See, e.g., Caroline Wolf
Harlow, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Special Report: Defense Counsel in
Criminal Cases 1 (2000), https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf (estimating that eightytwo percent of criminal defendants facing felony
charges cannot afford to hire counsel).
Unfortunately, in many jurisdictions the
indigent defense bar must perform these functions
despite overwhelming caseloads and extreme
underfunding. Such conditions are simply not
conducive to a rule like the Eleventh Circuit’s,
which shifts ultimate responsibility from the
prosecution, which is the party in the best position
to prevent and correct its knowing use of false
testimony at trial, to the defense, which is the
party that does not know the testimony is false and
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may lack the resources and time to uncover its
falsity.
Such a shift also threatens to divorce
prosecutors from their historic obligation to seek
justice, not convictions. Amicus has no doubt that
the problem Petitioner identifies is not the norm;
most prosecutors would not think of knowingly
introducing false testimony, much less refusing to
correct it. But for those prosecutors who have—and
would—the consequences should be clear:
if
discovered, any resulting conviction will be
reversed, regardless of whether the prosecutor
silently disclosed enough evidence to allow defense
counsel to uncover the falsehood.
The Eleventh Circuit erroneously rejected
this rule, and in so doing sent the pernicious
message that the U.S. Constitution winks at
convictions that are the product, at least in part, of
knowing false testimony. Such a rule disrespects
those prosecutors who play by the rules and
undermines the long-standing principles that have
governed the heightened ethical obligations that
have traditionally accompanied prosecutorial
powers in our system. Most importantly, this rule
deprives indigent defendants of the fairness and
due process that the Constitution guarantees that
common sense requires.
Put simply, prosecutors have great power,
and with that power comes a great responsibility to
ensure that convictions are the product of an
honest, fair, and just process. The Eleventh
Circuit’s rule allows prosecutors to pass that
responsibility off to overworked, under-resourced
defense counsel, and discourages prosecutors from
discharging their responsibilities in an ethical, fair,
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and transparent manner.
For these reasons,
Amicus respectfully submits that this Court should
grant the petition and hold that the Eleventh
Circuit’s rule is fundamentally inconsistent with
both the integrity of the criminal justice system
and prosecutors’ historic role in that system.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE INDIGENT DEFENSE BAR LACKS
THE RESOURCES TO MEET THE
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S UNWORKABLE
AND UNJUST STANDARD

Prosecutors should never be permitted to
obtain a conviction through the intentional and
knowing use of false testimony.
Under the
Eleventh Circuit’s rule, a prosecutor can potentially
avoid reversal if she can later show she disclosed
enough information that would have allowed
defense counsel to correct the testimony. Such a
rule is inconsistent with the fundamental
guarantees of fairness and due process. First, it
places the burden on underfunded public defenders
to correct a prosecutor’s intentional and knowing
use of false testimony, and is thus much less likely
to be effective in ensuring the integrity of criminal
trials.
Second,
this
rule
enables—and
incentivizes—a prosecutor to circumvent the duty
to correct false testimony and sends a message that
that the knowing use of false testimony will have
no consequences whatsoever. This is a prescription
for injustice.
To be sure, Amicus does not believe that
defense counsel will acquiesce to a prosecutor’s
knowing use of false testimony or will forego
serious efforts to correct it. Indeed, Amicus has no
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doubt that defense counsel will vigorously attempt
to correct false testimony when they know about it
or when they learn enough to suspect it. But, as
demonstrated below, defense counsel will often be
in a poor position to do so. A defense lawyer is
already, by definition, in the dark when a
prosecutor knowingly presents false testimony.
And exposing such errors is often difficult or
impossible because indigent defense systems
around the country often suffer from inadequate
resources and unreasonably high (sometimes
shockingly high) caseloads. These factors suggest
that the current system, in which the duty to
correct remains with the prosecutor, is the much
more effective and fair one. The Eleventh Circuit’s
misguided rule, if anything, makes it more likely
that criminal trials and convictions will be tainted
with unfairness and characterized by injustice. In
situations
where
indigent
defendants
are
represented by underfunded and often overworked
public defenders, this result is all but certain.
A.

The indigent defense bar is chronically
underfunded across the United States.

Public defense systems suffer from chronic
underfunding. For example, in 2009 alone, 37
states experienced significant shortfalls in public
defense by mid-year. See Nat’l Right to Counsel
Comm., Justice Denied: America’s Continuing
Neglect of Our Constitutional Right to Counsel 59
(Apr.
14,
2009)
(“Justice
Denied”),
https://constitutionproject.org/documents/justicedenied-america-s-continuing-neglect-of-ourconstitutional-right-to-counsel/. These budgetary
shortfalls have caused many public defender offices
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to drastically reduce funding, staff, and resources.
See id. at 59-60.
On average, spending on prosecution is three
times higher than on public defense. See William
D. Lawrence, The Public Defender Crisis in
America: Gideon, the War on Drugs and the Fight
for Equality, 5 U. Miami Race & Soc. Just. L. Rev.
167, 177 (2015). In fact, in 2008 spending on
prosecution and corrections overshadowed spending
on public defense by a ratio of 14:1. See id. at 178.
Similarly, a study of Kentucky’s funding in 2005
found that spending on indigent defense tallied
$56.4 million, while prosecutorial spending on
indigent cases alone amounted to $130–$139
million. Justice Denied at 61. Likewise, a study in
California found that, in 2006–2007, indigent
defense services were underfunded by at least $300
million. Further exacerbating this problem, the
funding gap between prosecution and indigent
defense in California grew 20% between 2003–2004
and 2006–2007. See id.
In the Eleventh Circuit, public defense is
also plagued by a chronic lack of funding. In
Florida, for example, the Brevard County Public
Defense office received $6.7 million in funding
during fiscal year 2014–2015, which was only onethird of the $17.2 million allocated to the
prosecutor’s office. Andrew Ford and J.D. Gallop,
Public Defenders Struggle to Stay Ahead: Brevard’s
Public Defender Face Long Days, Low Pay, and an
Overwhelming
Caseload
(“Brevard
Public
Defenders”), Florida Today, http://www.floridatoday
.com/story/news/local/2014/07/12/public-defendersstruggle-to-stay-ahead-of-caseloads-and-stress/
12569621/. Likewise, Georgia had no state-wide
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public defender program until 2003, and it did not
receive funding until 2005. See Southern Center
for
Human
Rights,
Right
to
Counsel,
https://www.schr.org/our-work/counsel (last visited
Sept. 11, 2017). To make matters worse, in one
Georgia judicial circuit, Cordele, the public defense
office had an annual caseload of 1700, amounting to
567 cases per attorney and resulting in defendants
waiting months before speaking to counsel.
Southern Center for Human Rights, Lack of
Representation
by
Public
Defender
Office
Challenged (Sept. 24, 2014), https://www.schr.org/
resources/process_for_selecting_cordele_circuit_pub
lic_defender.
Because jurisdictions across the country
suffer from comparable resource disparities and
excessive workloads, the implications of the
Eleventh Circuit’s ruling are far-reaching. Yet
another stark illustration of the public defense
crisis comes from Missouri, which ranks 49th in
state funding for public defense. In the face of
crippling staff shortages, the Director of the state
public defense system appointed then-Governor Jay
Nixon to serve as indigent defense counsel. Matt
Ford, A Governor Ordered to Serve as a Public
Defender,
The
Atlantic
(Aug.
4,
2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2016/08/when-the-governor-is-your-lawyer/494453/.
While largely a symbolic gesture, the move was a
public cry for help by a system facing crisis-level
funding deficits and unmanageable caseloads.
Ultimately, the dire situation facing public
defender systems—as evidenced by underfunding
and extraordinary caseloads—has led public
defense lawyers to repeatedly seek relief from the
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courts. See, e.g., Wilbur v. City of Mt. Vernon, 989
F. Supp. 2d 1122 (W.D. Wash. 2013); Public
Defender v. Florida, 115 So. 3d 261 (Fla. 2013);
State ex rel. Missouri Public Defender Comm’n v.
Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 599-601 (Mo. 2012);
Simmons v. State Public Defender, 791 N.W.2d 69,
89 (Iowa 2010). It is also an unmistakable sign
that public defenders face difficult obstacles when
striving to ensure the fairness and integrity of the
criminal justice process. The Eleventh Circuit’s
rule increases the likelihood that these difficulties
will become insurmountable, and that no remedy
will exist when a prosecutor knowingly uses false
testimony to secure a conviction.
B.

Crushing caseloads prevent thorough
investigation by the indigent defense
bar.
The American Bar Association standards call
for reasonable caseloads for indigent defense
counsel, acknowledging explicitly that the quality
of defense suffers significantly as caseloads
increase. See Am. Bar Ass’n Standing Comm. on
Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, Ten Principles of
A Public Defense Delivery System 3 (Feb. 2002),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/admi
nistrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_
def_tenprinciplesbooklet.authcheckedam.pdf.
Yet
in many jurisdictions workloads are so onerous that
the right to counsel exists merely in the abstract.
See Christopher Campbell, Ph.D., et al., Unnoticed,
Untapped
and
Underappreciated:
Clients’
Perceptions of Their Public Defenders, 33 Behav.
Sci. & L. 751, 753 (2015).
For example, in Brevard County, Florida, the
18 public defenders handling felony cases each
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worked 433 felony cases, nearly tripling the 150case limit suggested by the National Association of
Chief Defenders decades ago and rising to three
times the standard suggested by recent workload
studies in other jurisdictions. See Ford and Gallop,
Brevard Public Defenders; Geoffrey T. Burkhart,
How to Leverage Public Defense Workload Studies,
14 Ohio State J. Crim. L. 403, 423 (2017). Public
defenders handling misdemeanors had 810 cases
per attorney, which is double the recommended 400
misdemeanor cases per attorney. See Ford and
Gallop, Brevard Public Defenders. And in Dade
County, Florida, average caseloads rose in recent
years from “367 to nearly 500 felonies and from
1380 to 2225 misdemeanors.” Justice Denied at 68.
What’s more, these skyrocketing caseloads occurred
in the face of a 12.6% budget reduction. See id.
These crushing caseloads have led defenders
in some jurisdictions—including jurisdictions
within the Eleventh Circuit’s purview, see, e.g.,
Public Defender v. Florida, 115 So. 3d 261—to
refuse additional cases. See also Justice Denied at
68 (describing response in 2006, when six
misdemeanor
attorneys
in
Knox
County,
Tennessee, had to handle “over 10,000 cases,
averaging just less than one hour per case.”).
To make matters worse, staffing levels are
also on unequal footing, with state prosecutors
typically enjoying more—and higher paid—staff
than public defense institutions. Id. at 61-63. For
example, prosecutors in Cumberland, New Jersey,
have over seven times the investigative staff on
hand than do their indigent defense counterparts.
See id.
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Beyond legal staffing, the public defense bar
has far fewer critical support services than
prosecutors, even though prosecutors have built-in
investigative support in law enforcement agencies.
See id. Prosecutors also benefit from state and
federal resources such as crime labs, expert
witnesses, and special investigators. See id. In
contrast, public defenders must often carve
resources from already emaciated budgets for these
functions or seek prior approval from the court,
which is often denied. Id. These disparities
demonstrate that the deck is stacked against
indigent defense counsel who strive to provide
effective assistance to criminal defendants and
ensure the fairness of a criminal trial.
The
Eleventh Circuit’s rule makes it more likely—if not
certain—that public defenders will be unable to
achieve these salutary objectives.
C.

The Eleventh Circuit places the burden
to detect and correct false testimony on
the wrong party.

Overwhelming
caseloads,
shockingly
inadequate funding, and lack of institutional
resources demonstrate that the public defense bar
cannot—and should not—bear the burden of
identifying and combating false testimony that the
prosecution already knows is false. By excusing a
prosecutor’s knowing use of false testimony when
the prosecutor has disclosed the material that
demonstrates its falsity, the Eleventh Circuit
places the burden on the wrong party and devalues
the ethical obligations prosecutors must uphold
when seeking a conviction.
The practical consequences of such a rule
could, and likely will, exacerbate an already-

12
disturbing trend in criminal practice generally—
namely, so-called document dumps in which the
State “discloses” voluminous quantities of
documents to the defense on the eve of trial. See
Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v.
Maryland: Games Prosecutors Play, 57 Case
Western L. Rev. 531, 542-48 (2007); Joel Cohen &
Danielle Alfonzo Walsman, The ‘Brady Dump’:
Problems With ‘Open File’ Discovery, N.Y. L. J.
(Sept. 4, 2009). Such gamesmanship stretches
already thin resources to their breaking point,
sometimes preventing the defense from discovering
and effectively using important evidence. And
when combined with the Eleventh Circuit’s
standard such practices would become especially
pernicious. These last-minute disclosures would
not only undermine a meaningful defense, but also
would inoculate the knowing subornation of false
testimony during the trial itself. Put simply, the
Eleventh Circuit’s rule enables prosecutors to say,
“yes, I knowingly used false testimony to mislead
the court and jury, but I’m not responsible because
you didn’t catch me.” Due process and basic
guarantees of fairness require much more.
This underscores the dangerous result
flowing from a misguided legal standard that
makes unfairness in the criminal justice process
more likely and unaccountability in the prosecution
of criminal defendants all but certain. The burden
of preventing and correcting false testimony should
be placed on the shoulders of the attorneys who, by
definition, know the testimony is false and are
constitutionally charged with a duty to seek justice:
prosecutors.
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II.

EXCUSING PROSECUTORS’
INTRODUCTION OF FALSE
TESTIMONY UNDERMINES
PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS

The Eleventh Circuit’s rule not only
threatens the integrity of the trials infected by the
knowing presentation of false testimony, but also
sends a larger message that threatens to infect the
entire criminal justice system.
After all, the
integrity of the criminal justice system depends, in
large part, on public faith in the integrity of
prosecutors. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S.
78, 88 (1935) (“It is fair to say that the average jury
. . . has confidence that these obligations, which so
plainly rest upon the prosecuting attorney, will be
faithfully observed.”). Indeed, prosecutors make
important decisions every single day about who
gets charged, who gets prosecuted, who goes to jail,
and who goes free. For this reason, the Court has
said for a century that United States attorneys are
not mere advocates but servants of justice. See id.
The high ethical standards imposed on prosecutors
by our adversarial system are particularly
important when a defendant is indigent and relies
on public defense for representation. The Eleventh
Circuit’s rule allows prosecutors to evade these
standards at their convenience and to prioritize the
securing of convictions over the necessity of
ensuring justice.
A.

The criminal justice system imposes
high ethical standards on prosecutors
because they are servants of the law.

Prosecutors have a special role in the United
States criminal justice system.
As the Court
explained in United States v. Berger, a federal
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prosecutor is the “representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as
its obligation to govern at all[.]” 295 U.S. at 88.
The prosecutorial role—and therefore duties—is
distinct from the defense attorney’s role. A defense
attorney in the criminal justice system is an officer
of the court, but not a “servant of the law” in the
“peculiar” and “definitive” sense that a prosecutor
is. Id. In short, prosecutors are obligated to seek
justice, not convictions at any cost.
The ethical standards for prosecutors and
criminal defense attorneys reflect this difference.
Because a prosecutor serves the public and has no
individual client, her duty is that “justice shall be
done.”
Id.
In contrast, a criminal defense
attorney’s duty is to her client, protecting the
client’s legal rights in a complex system. See
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932); see also
Criminal Justice Standards for the Defense
Function, § 4-1.2 (Am. Bar Ass’n 4th ed.). In
essence, our adversarial system depends on both
the advocacy of defense counsel and the
independent duty of the prosecutor to seek justice.
Moreover, as officers of the court, both
defense counsel and prosecutors owe duties of
candor to the court, but the nuances of those duties
differ because of the prosecutorial powers in the
adversarial system.
Specifically, while ethical
standards recognize that defense counsel’s duty of
candor must be “tempered” in some cases by
“competing ethical and constitutional obligations,”
the prosecution has no such competing interest.
Compare Criminal Justice Standards for the
Defense Function, § 4-1.4 (Am. Bar Ass’n 4th ed.)
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with Criminal Justice Standards for the
Prosecution Function, § 3-1.4 (Am. Bar Ass’n 4th
ed.). Thus, prosecutors have a “heightened” duty of
candor, precisely because of their role as a servant
of the public. See Criminal Justice Standards for
the Prosecution Function, § 3-1.4 (Am. Bar Ass’n
4th ed.). This duty of candor prohibits prosecutors
from making statements of “fact or law, or
offer[ing] evidence, that the prosecutor does not
reasonably believe to be true[.]” Id. § 3-1.4(b).
Likewise, prosecutors have further ethical duties to
correct false evidence or testimony when they have
introduced it. Id. § 3-6.6(c). The Eleventh Circuit’s
rule transforms this duty from mandatory to
optional with no consequences—except for indigent
criminal defendants.
At bottom, prosecutors have an unflagging
duty to seek justice, and “[i]t is as much [their]
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated
to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use
every legitimate means to bring about a just one.”
Berger, 295 U.S. at 88. The Eleventh Circuit’s
decision disregards these principles and makes it
more, not less, likely that prosecutors will use
“improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction.” Id.
B.

Permitting prosecutors to knowingly
use false testimony undermines
prosecutorial ethics and contributes to
a culture of corruption.

Lowering the standards imposed on
prosecutors threatens the integrity of the criminal
justice system because prosecutors will have
limited consequences and the behavior will become
normalized. As Petitioner shows, the only remedy
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for prosecutorial misconduct is reversal of the
conviction. See Pet’r Br. at 30-31. Studies of state
prosecutorial discipline show that only a handful of
prosecutors have been disciplined for misconduct,
despite courts reversing convictions and ordering
new trials for misconduct many more times. See
Shawn Musgrave, New England Ctr. for
Investigative Reporting, Scant Discipline Follows
Prosecutors’ Impropriety in Massachusetts, (Mar. 6,
2017),
https://www.necir.org/2017/03/06/scantdiscipline-follows-prosecutors-improprietymassachusetts/
(describing
120
reversed
convictions since 1985 in Massachusetts, but only
two prosecutors publicly disciplined since 1980);
Joaquin Sapien and Sergio Hernandez, ProPublica,
Who Polices Prosecutors Who Abuse Their
Authority? Usually Nobody, (Apr. 3 & 5, 2013),
https://www.propublica.org/article/
who-policesprosecutors-who-abuse-their-authority-usuallynobody (describing 30 reversed convictions in New
York City, but only one prosecutor publicly
disciplined).
Given these facts, if the Eleventh Circuit’s
standard is upheld, no regularly enforceable
remedy for the use of false testimony will exist, and
no mechanism will exist to deter prosecutors from
intentionally and knowingly using false testimony
to secure a conviction. Thus, such a standard will
degrade prosecutorial ethics, compromise the
reliability of criminal verdicts, and undermine
appellate courts’ capacity to correct resulting
injustice—all at the expense of indigent criminal
defendants. Cf. United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d
625, 631-32 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J.,
dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc) (“When a
public official behaves with such casual disregard
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for his constitutional obligations and the rights of
the accused, it erodes the public’s trust in our
justice system, and chips away at the foundational
premises of the rule of law.
When such
transgressions are acknowledged yet forgiven by
the courts, we endorse and invite their repetition.”).
Importantly, while most prosecutors will not
use false testimony, the change in standard will
nonetheless affect their behavior, whether
intentionally or not. Behavioral economics shows
that standards can institutionalize poor individual
and organizational behavior. When an individual
sees an institution tolerating behavior in another,
then the individual will internalize that they, too,
are permitted to engage in similar behavior. See
Linda Klebe Trevino & Stuart A. Youngblood, Bad
Apples in Bad Barrels: A Causal Analysis of Ethical
Decision-Making, 75 J. Applied Psychol. 378, 379
(1990). This phenomenon is pronounced where the
individual rationalizes that “by serving the
company’s interest, they are also serving the
public’s interest.” Blake E. Ashforth & Vikas
Anand, The Normalization of Corruption in
Organizations, 25 Res. in Org. Behav. 6 (2003).
Further contributing to the institutional pressure
to engage in bad behavior, “leniency and low
frequency of formal sanctioning by governments
and professional associations often makes [bad
behavior] . . . rational.” Id.
Accordingly, if the Court permits the
Eleventh Circuit’s rule to stand, thus excusing
prosecutors from any consequences flowing from
the knowing use of false testimony in the
courtroom, it will normalize conduct that
compromises the integrity of the criminal justice
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system and undermines the Constitution’s
guarantees of fairness and due process for all
defendants, regardless of their socio-economic
status. Without condemning the improper use of
false testimony, the Court will signal a tacit
encouragement for others to engage in this
behavior. To prevent that result, this Court should
grant certiorari and reverse the Eleventh Circuit’s
decision.
III.

THE
ELEVENTH
CIRCUIT’S
STANDARD
THREATENS
THE
INTEGRITY OF CRIMINAL TRIALS

The Eleventh Circuit’s standard also
undermines this Court’s repeated admonitions
about the prosecutor’s fundamental obligation to
ensure that convictions are not obtained through
the knowing use of false testimony. See Napue v.
Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Mesarosh v. United
States, 352 U.S. 1 (1956); Mooney v. Holohan, 294
U.S. 103 (1935). Breaking with this strong body of
law, the Eleventh Circuit conflated two distinct
elements of due process: the prosecutorial duty to
disclose exculpatory evidence and the prosecutorial
duty not to knowingly introduce false testimony. In
so doing, the Eleventh Circuit added a requirement
to obtain relief for violations of the latter—a
defendant must also show that the prosecution
withheld evidence of the testimony’s falsity. This
additional requirement was based on the separate
duty to disclose exculpatory evidence. But the
additional requirement destroys the integrity of the
trial process, and severely undermines the ability
of public defenders to ensure the integrity of that
process.
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A defendant cannot have a fair trial when it
is based on false evidence knowingly introduced by
the prosecution. Indeed, Napue was based on the
principle, “implicit in any concept of ordered
liberty,” that the government “may not knowingly
use false evidence, including false testimony, to
obtain a tainted conviction[.]” Napue, 360 U.S. at
269 (emphasis added). To this end, prosecutors
must carry the burden to obtain convictions
through just means. After all, “‘[a] lie is a lie, no
matter what its subject, and, if it is in any way
relevant to the case, the district attorney has the
responsibility and duty to correct what he knows to
be false and elicit the truth.’” Id. at 270 (quoting
People v. Savvides, 136 N.E. 2d 853, 854-55 (N.Y.
1956)).
The Eleventh Circuit’s standard ignores the
fundamental corruption of the trial process when a
conviction is based on false testimony.
False
testimony alone is already a problem that the
courts regularly combat, particularly in the context
of jailhouse informants. See generally Center on
Wrongful Convictions, The Snitch System: How
Snitch Testimony Sent Randy Steidl and Other
Innocent Americans to Death Row (Winter 2004–
2005), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/legalclinic/
wrongfulconvictions/documents/SnitchSystemBookl
et.pdf; Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108
Colum. L. Rev. 55, 60 (2008) (finding in a
comprehensive study of 200 exonerations that 18%
of exonerees were convicted, in part, based on
informant testimony). Permitting prosecutors to
knowingly use false testimony, as was the case
here, will worsen the false testimony problem, and
result in more wrongful convictions.
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Ultimately, the burden to ensure a fair trial
cannot rest solely on the work of defense counsel.
The role of defense counsel is to protect his client’s
legal rights, not to police prosecutors. Placing the
burden on defense counsel alone, during trial, to
combat prosecutorial misconduct would be
devastating to the criminal justice system and
undermine the adversarial process. This Court has
recognized that it is not defense counsel’s burden
alone to correct false testimony.
Rather, the
pursuit of a fair trial is a shared obligation among
the court, the prosecution, and defense counsel
because “[t]he government of a strong and free
nation does not need convictions based upon such
testimony. It cannot afford to abide [by] them.”
Mesarosh, 352 U.S at 14.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should
grant the petition.
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